14-11766 Gaines and Watson (Doc. # 54)

In Re Gaines and Watson, 14-11766 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 15, 2015) Doc. # 54

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SIGNED this 14th day of May, 2015.




IN RE: )
ROBERT DALE GAINES and ) Case No. 14-11766
TINA LEA WATSON, ) Chapter 13
Debtors. )



Kansas recognizes common law marriages. If each member of a couple has
capacity to marry, intends to be married, and holds themselves out as husband and
wife, common law deems them wed. Married couples may file joint bankruptcy cases.
But if the couple’s marital status is challenged, it is their burden to prove that they
are married as a matter of law and therefore entitled to relief. Kansas homestead law
preserves the exempt character of a debtor’s homestead unless a creditor can
demonstrate by “positive and clear evidence” that the debtor has abandoned the home


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without intention to return. This case presents an interesting intersection of those
two state law principles.1

After Robert Gaines and his former wife were divorced, he became romantically
involved with Tina Watson, living with her in Salina, Kansas. When she became ill,
he and she declared to Robert’s employer that they were domestic partners and he
enrolled her in his employer’s health insurance plan. Each testified to their devotion
to one another, that they consider themselves married, and that they hold themselves
out as married. When they began to live together, both had been divorced. If they
demonstrated that they met the three standards for common law marriage on the
date they filed this case, they are eligible to be joint debtors. Robert owns the home
that Tina periodically inhabited in Oberlin (first from 2008-2010 and again later from
July 2013 to and including the date of the bankruptcy petition), but both debtors
relocated to Salina for work in 2010 where they lived together part of the time during
which they claimed they were married. They claim the Oberlin house as their
homestead, stating that they intend to return to Oberlin to live. Whether they’re
married or not, if each debtor has demonstrated the requisite intent to return to and
inhabit the house in Oberlin as their homestead, the Oberlin house retains its exempt


1 The chapter 13 trustee Laurie B. Williams appears by her attorney Karin N.
Amyx. The debtors appear by their attorney Rick Hodge.


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Sometime in the late 1990s, Robert and Tina met while they were working for
the school district in Brighton, Colorado and formed a friendship. Each was married
to someone else then, but they were both having marital issues. Robert had lived in
Oberlin, Kansas as a child and relocated there from Colorado in 2000 when he
purchased a home on Beaver Street. He worked out of his garage as a mechanic and
lived there with his wife, Celeste, until they left Oberlin sometime around 2008.
Robert eventually took a job at Phillips Lighting in Salina, about 200 miles east of
Oberlin. Though it isn’t clear when, it appears that he and Celeste relocated to Salina
in 2010, renting a home on Seitz Avenue. He and Celeste separated in 2010 and were
divorced by the Saline County District Court in 2011.

Meanwhile, Tina had moved with her mother and daughter to Oberlin
sometime in 2008. Now divorced, Tina moved her family into the Beaver Street
property, apparently with Robert’s permission.2 He stated that she was in trouble
and he was helping to extricate her from “a bad situation.” She lived there until 2010
when her job at the Oberlin Chamber of Commerce was eliminated. Robert
encouraged her to come to Salina where he found her a place to live and a job at
Casey’s General Store. According to the Statement of Financial Affairs (SOFA),
Question 15, she lived at 330½ South 8th in Salina beginning in July of 2010.3 Robert
testified that after he got divorced, he moved in with her. The SOFA suggests that

2 When Tina moved from Colorado to Kansas she obtained a Kansas driver’s license.
Issued on November 4, 2008, it expired on September 11, 2014 but Tina has not
renewed it. It bears the Beaver Street, Oberlin address. See Ex. 3.
3 When Tina moved to Salina, Robert rented the Oberlin property out to tenants
between July 2010 and July 2013.


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they also occupied a property on Briarwood in Salina (August 2011 to June 2013)
before they leased the current Hartford address property in Salina, where Robert
lived at the time this case was filed.

Robert owns the Oberlin house outright; Tina and he have possessions in both
places. Tina moved back to Oberlin sometime in 2013 after the tenants vacated the
Beaver Street property. For some indefinite period after that, Robert would travel to
Oberlin on weekends to see Tina or vice versa. Robert described Tina’s move back to
Oberlin as a “cost-cutting” measure. Since July 2013, Tina has lived at various times
in both Oberlin and Salina. They occupied a series of residences, though it is
somewhat unclear in what order or how long they resided at each. It does appear that
they lived together at various times but, on July 31, 2014, the date of the petition,
they were living apart.4 Both debtors testified that they intend to return to Oberlin
to live full time because the Salina Phillips Lighting plant is for sale and may well
close. To this end, they purportedly mailed an undated letter to their landlord a week
before the trial of this matter to advise the landlord of their intent to terminate the
tenancy on Hartford and move out by the end of April 2015.5 Robert testified that he
intends to live permanently in the Beaver house – as his retirement home. Tina is
not currently working but may return to Casey’s General Store to complete training
for a management position to enable her to transfer to a store near Oberlin.

4 The petition shows Robert having a current address at the Hartford property inSalina while Tina has a current address at the Beaver property in Oberlin. ScheduleJ, line 24 indicates they are currently living apart.
5 Ex. 4. This undated document introduced into evidence is the only one where Tina
used the “Gaines” surname.


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Tina became ill at some point in their relationship and required
hospitalization. She has a chronic illness that apparently manifested itself in
February of 2014. There are no physician specialists in Oberlin so she seeks periodic
medical care in Salina. When Tina became acutely ill in February of 2014, Robert and
she decided it was time for them to “quit playing house” as he put it. According to
Robert, Tina’s health event was the definitive moment when he and Tina became
husband and wife. He then took measures to place her on Phillips Lighting’s employee
health plan as his dependent. He enrolled Tina shortly thereafter, claiming her as his
“domestic partner.” As part of the paperwork, both Tina and Robert executed a
“Phillips Health Plans Document of Domestic Partnership” or DDP.6 The DDP states
the signers “certify” that they are eligible for coverage as “domestic partners” under
the company’s health plan and that they are, among other things, at least 18, not
related by blood or adoptions, live together in a committed monogamous relationship,
and have been in such a relationship for the prior six months. They also certify that
they “are not married to each other or legally married to, or in a domestic partnership
with, any other person.” The DDP that debtors offered in evidence is undated.

Additional documentation accompanying the DDP that appears to have been
printed from the company benefits website defines “domestic partner” as someone of
the same or opposite sex who is an adult partner of the employee living together for
at least six months, mutually dependent and financially responsible for one another’s
wellbeing, not related to one another and not married to or a domestic partner of a

6 Ex. 8, p. 18.


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third party. The domestic partner definition doesn’t exclude a person who is married
to the employee.7 At the same time, a spouse qualifies as a dependent and Robert
could have enrolled Tina as his spouse if they were in a common law marriage at that


It is unclear if Robert was able to add Tina to his employer’s health coverage
when they executed the DDP document mid-year. The same website screenshot
suggests that he was outside the enrollment window to add Tina as a dependent to
his employer’s health plan in 2014.9 Both of Robert’s 2014 and 2015 Enrollment
Summaries that show Tina as his dependent for health coverage were “selected” as
of December 2, 2014, suggesting that Tina was not actually enrolled as a dependent
domestic partner under Robert’s health plan until late 2014 or more likely, 2015.10
Finally, Robert also named Tina as his beneficiary under a life insurance policy
obtained through his employment.11

Robert and Tina filed separate Form 1040 tax returns for 2012, 2013, and 2014.
Each filed as a “single” taxpayer. They amended their respective 2014 returns to file
as “married filing separately,” signing those amended returns on March 11, 2015, a
week before the trial of this matter.12 They testified that they amended their 2014

7 Id. at p. 22.
8 A domestic partner is clearly a separate and distinct dependent category from a
married person under the health plan. Both relationships qualify as eligible
dependents of the employee under Robert’s health plan. See Ex. 8, p.21.

Id. The screen also cautions that “[a]dding a dependent here does NOT
automatically enroll him/her in any benefits.”
10 Id. at pp. 19-20.
11 Id. at p. 23.
12 Ex. 6 and 7.


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returns because their accountant told them that filing as single persons could be
construed as tax fraud. Their explanation provided on the amended returns states
that they are common law husband and wife and that their attorney advised them
they “had to file married filing separate.”13

In his testimony, Robert insisted that he often referred to Tina as his wife in
conversations with third parties. She agreed that he acted like a husband, bringing
her lunch to work, for instance, and that they had acted as husband and wife as early
as 2012 when Robert proposed to her while they were on a motorcycle ride. There was
no evidence that they obtained or wore wedding rings. According to Robert, Tina was
a signatory on his bank account but not an account owner due to her prior history of
unpaid debts. Their bankruptcy intake questionnaire dated June 10, 2014 shows Tina
as Robert’s spouse and both living at the Hartford address in Salina.14

Robert and Tina filed their joint chapter 13 petition on July 31, 2014. Robert
listed his address as the Hartford Street, Salina address while Tina, as joint debtor,
listed her address as the 302 N. Beaver, Oberlin address.15 On Schedule J, line 24,
debtors state that they “live apart right now,” but anticipate Robert moving to Oberlin
if he loses his employment with Phillips in Salina. They claimed this Beaver property
as their exempt homestead. In their first amended chapter 13 plan they propose to

13 Ex. 6 and 7, Part III of Form 1040X. Both amended returns listed the Hartford
address in Salina as their current home address.
14 Ex. 1.
15 The Court notes that on December 2, 2014, Tina filed a change of address from “302

N. Beaver, Oberlin, KS 67749” to “306 N. Beaver Ave., Oberlin, KS 67749.” See Dkt.
28. On the notice, Tina used the surname of Gaines. This change of address was not
mentioned at trial.

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pay $250 per month over an applicable commitment period of 60 months but seek to
deviate from the disposable income calculation on Form 22C under In re Lanning,
due to Tina’s unemployment, and propose no distribution to unsecured creditors.16
The chapter 13 trustee objects to the claimed homestead exemption on the basis that
Robert does not occupy the Oberlin property as his principal residence.17 She also
objects to confirmation of the plan and filed a motion for dismissal under 11 U.S.C. §
302 on the basis that debtors are not married and ineligible to file a joint case.18 At
trial, the evidence focused on the debtors’ eligibility to be joint debtors and their
homestead exemption. In post-trial briefing, debtors submitted a certified copy of
Robert’s divorce decree from Celeste entered by the Saline County District Court on
February 2, 2011 to support his trial testimony.19 The trustee objects to admission of
this document as part of the evidentiary record and asks that it be stricken and not
considered by the Court.20 The Court will address the propriety of considering the
divorce decree when it addresses the common law marriage issue below.


Is the 302 N. Beaver, Oberlin residence the debtors’ homestead?

16 Dkt. 36.
17 Dkt. 16.
18 Dkt. 22 and 38.
19 Dkt. 50. In closing argument, the chapter 13 trustee questioned Robert’s capacity
to marry Tina because she challenged Robert’s proof that he had obtained a divorce
from Celeste as he testified. The trustee had offered no proof into evidence that Robert
remained married to Celeste but suggested that she was unable to find any record of
their divorce decree. Robert’s divorce from Celeste was essential to demonstrate that
he had the capacity to marry Tina.
20 Dkt. 51.


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The Trustee objects to the debtors’ homestead exemption.21 She argues that

Robert’s and Tina’s repeated absence amounts to an abandonment of the homestead.

Kansas residents may claim their home as a homestead if they meet the following

criteria set out in the Kansas Constitution and statutes. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301

implements the homestead exemption afforded all Kansans in the Kansas

Constitution at Article 15, § 9. Section 9 provides that—

A homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres of farming land, orof one acre within the limits of an incorporated town or city, occupied as a
residence by the family of the owner, together with all the improvements on
the same, shall be exempted from forced sale under any process of law, and
shall not be alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife, when thatrelation exists; . . .22

The statutory exemption § 60-2301 contains the same provisions almost

verbatim.23 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) authorizes a debtor to elect to claim property exempt

for his bankruptcy estate if it is exempt at state law and if such an election is

permitted under state law. Kansas law directs that, with certain exceptions not

relevant here, debtors may only claim state law exemptions.24 Parties in bankruptcy

cases who file timely objections to exemptions bear the burden of proving the

exemption is not properly claimed.25 Here, the trustee’s principle objection is that

21 Dkt. 16.
22 KAN. CONST. Art. 15, § 9.
23 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (2014 Supp.). In addition to the language in the state
constitution, the statutory provision makes clear that a homestead exemption may
be claimed in a manufactured home or mobile home occupied as a residence. It also
clarifies that when property outside a city is claimed exempt, the homestead rights
are not lost when the property is subsequently annexed by the city. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-524a (2014 Supp.).
24 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2312(a) (2005).
25 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c); In re Letterman, 356 B.R. 540, 542 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).


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Robert is absent from Oberlin and maintains a residence in Salina. Robert credibly
testified that he has retained the house, which is unencumbered, as a retirement
home. He also testified that his employer was about to sell its plant in Salina and
that he would move back to Oberlin and live in the home there. He acted upon this
intent by giving notice to his landlord of his intent to terminate his Salina tenancy at
the end of April, 2015, and move back to “our home in Oberlin.” He allowed Tina to
live there as his wife or domestic partner since July of 2013 and they had belongings
and furnishings in the Oberlin home. The trustee did not effectively controvert any
of this testimony.

A long line of Kansas cases holds that when an absent homesteader shows an
intention to return, the uninhabited homestead retains its exempt character. In
Bellport v. Harder, the Kansas Supreme Court said that “[W]hile occupancy as a
residence is essential to the establishment of a homestead, once a residence has been
established, such residence is presumed to continue until the contrary is clearly
shown.”26 Even a debtor’s acquiring property and residing in another state does not
terminate the homestead in the absence of “positive and clear” evidence.27 Nor does
the fact that Robert rented the Oberlin home to tenants for a few years during his
absence establish an abandonment of the homestead.28 The trustee didn’t show that
Robert had taken any steps, other than being absent for an extended period of time,
to terminate his homestead interest. She certainly did not prove by positive and clear

26 Bellport v. Harder, 196 Kan. 294, 298, 411 P.2d 725 (1966).
27 Elliott v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 71 Kan. 665, 81 Pac. 500, 501 (1905).
28 Bellport, supra at 298.


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evidence that he has abandoned the Oberlin property; nor did she meet the
presumption that a homestead continues once it has been established. To the
contrary, while working his job in Salina, Robert comes and goes from there
frequently and allows Tina to live there, too. They have personal belongings at the
Oberlin home. He and she pay utilities and otherwise maintains the property. At a
minimum, Robert has clearly demonstrated his intent to return to the Oberlin
property upon ending his employment in Salina and retiring to his permanent
residence with Tina.29

The same rules apply to determining whether Tina’s homestead exemption
claim is valid, though she is in a different position because she has inhabited the
property since 2013, as either Robert’s domestic partner, his common law wife, or
simply at Robert’s sufferance. She moved from Salina back to Oberlin in the summer
of 2013 and has occupied the property since that time, with periodic trips to Salina
for medical care or to spend time with Robert. Tina listed the Oberlin property as her
current address on the bankruptcy petition. Her lack of a record title interest does
not weaken her homestead claim if she occupies the home as a family residence.
Indeed, in Redmond v. Kester, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the term “owner”
in both the Constitution and the statute includes occupants who hold any type of
interest, including the equitable interest that a beneficiary of a self-settled living

29 See Beard v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 215 Kan. 343, 348, 524 P.2d 1159 (1974)
(Residence means the place adopted by a person as his place of habitation, and towhich, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.).


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trust holds.30 So even if Tina is not married to Robert and cannot claim a homestead
interest as his spouse, her previously-established occupancy of that property as his
domestic partner would suffice to render her interest in the home exempt as well.31
Nothing the trustee has presented overcomes Tina’s established occupancy nor her
intent to continue to occupy the home with Robert, either as his domestic partner or
his common law spouse. Keeping in mind Kansas policy to liberally construe claims
of homestead exemption and the trustee’s burden of proof on an exemption claim, the
trustee’s objection to Robert and Tina’s homestead exemption must be overruled.32

Were Robert Gaines and Tina Watson married when the bankruptcy
case was filed?

This is a much closer question. Kansas has long recognized common law
marriages. In general, if a man and a woman have the capacity to marry, if they
presently agree to be married, and if they hold themselves out to the public as being
married, state law recognizes them as husband and wife.33 It is essential that the

30 Redmond v. Kester, 284 Kan. 209, 216, 159 P.3d 1004 (2007). See also In re Estate
of Fink, 4 Kan. App. 2d 523, 532-33, 609 P.2d 211 (1980) (Even though wife lefthomestead due to husband’s drinking, and property was sold after his death to herchildren, she intended to inhabit the home they intended to build for her. Her
homestead interest through her husband continued without regard to her loss ofactual record title ownership of the fee.).
31 Redmond v. Kester, supra at 216 (Debtors may claim homestead exemption basedon any interest in real estate, whether legal or equitable, as long as they have notabandoned their occupation or intent to occupy the property.). See also In re Brown,
408 B.R. 262 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (Debtor who occupied homestead with hisdomestic partner had equitable interest in property and could claim property exempt
even though it was titled in the name of the other partner.).
32 Redmond v. Kester, supra at 212.
33 Fleming v. Fleming, 221 Kan. 290, 291, 559 P.2d 329 (1977).


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parties have a present mutual intention to be married; evidence of consent to cohabit,
without a present marriage agreement between them, is insufficient.34 The party
asserting a common law marriage has the burden of proving it.35 Only married
debtors may file a joint bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. § 302. Here, the trustee
asserts that Robert Gaines and Tina Watson were not married as a matter of law on
the date of the petition, July 31, 2014, and cannot seek joint relief.

Both debtors testified that they were divorced from their prior spouses before
moving in together. Nothing in the record sheds doubt on their being free to marry at
any time after Robert’s divorce in 2011.36 At trial, each testified that they consider
themselves married and described generally how they hold themselves out to the
world as being married. But the evidence that was presented requires deeper
examination because whether Robert and Tina shared a present intention to be
married is less than clear. The Court did not have the benefit of any independent
witnesses regarding the debtors’ relationship to corroborate the debtors’ testimony
and is left to determine the credibility of the debtors’ testimony and the weight to be
given the limited documentary evidence presented to ascertain the debtors’ intent.
The Court is troubled by the inconsistencies in the debtors’ testimony and the lack of

34 Id.
35 Driscoll v. Driscoll, 220 Kan. 225, 227, 552 P.2d 629 (1976).
36 Robert Gaines testified affirmatively that he obtained a divorce from his then-wifeCeleste in 2011, but did not offer at trial a copy of his divorce decree. Debtors’ counsel
appended a certified copy of the Saline County District Court decree to his post-trialbrief and the trustee moved to strike it. Because Robert’s testimony was not refutedwith evidence at trial, there is sufficient evidence in the record without the decree to
find that he had the capacity to marry at the time he and Tina began cohabiting.


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corroborating documents that would have been within the debtors’ control to

Robert and Tina reconnected after several years in 2010, the same year that
Robert separated from his then-wife. Tina had been living in Oberlin (in Robert’s
home) and after she lost her job there, he arranged for her to move to Salina and
helped her find a job. He testified that when he lost his home in Salina, after getting
divorced, he moved in with her. Thus, sometime in 2011, they began cohabitating.
Each testified that they began “seeing” one another romantically in 2012 and that
Robert asked Tina if she wanted to get married in 2012 while they were on a
motorcycle ride. But neither Robert nor Tina testified that they considered
themselves married as early as 2012; in fact, neither of them testified clearly how
long they had been in a common law marriage. Robert cited Tina’s illness in February
2014 as the defining moment and time to “quit playing house.” By contrast, Tina
testified that she “sometimes thinks” they might get married. Even if the Court
accepts Robert’s testimony, their actions belie their words.

37 For example, no lease agreement was offered into evidence showing Robert and
Tina as joint tenants of the Hartford property, or any other rented property, in Salina.
No bank records or other financial records were introduced to show that theycombined their financial affairs. No utility billing statements were presented to showthat utilities were set up in both of their names. No car titles were introduced showing
joint ownership of vehicles. In fact, the only documents admitted into evidence that
suggesting a marital relationship, were the debtors’ bankruptcy intake
questionnaire, an undated notice of vacating the Hartford tenancy signed by “Boband Tina Gaines,” and an amended 2014 tax return. The latter two documents were
generated about a week before trial.


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While they lived together in Salina, Robert and Tina jointly occupied several
leased homes and purchased a storage shed. They received their mail at Salina and
sometimes received mail addressed to them both. They began referring to each other
as husband and wife to third parties. Tina returned to Robert’s home in Oberlin in
July of 2013 while Robert remained in Salina and worked. At that point, they both
went back and forth between Salina and Oberlin. Robert traveled on weekends to
spend time with Tina and Tina would travel to Salina periodically for medical care or
to be with Robert. Robert testified that they decided to stop “playing house” and to do
whatever was necessary to get Tina on Robert’s workplace health plan after she
became ill in February of 2014. There is no evidence of when they executed the DDP.
When they sought bankruptcy advice from their counsel, they represented
themselves as husband and wife on the intake sheet. When they filed this case they
listed separate addresses – Tina in Oberlin and Robert in Salina. After they filed this
case, they filed their 2014 federal income tax returns as single taxpayers, then
amended them in March of 2015 to file as “married filing separately.” On their
amended returns, they each listed the Hartford address in Salina as their current
home address. Their 2012 and 2013 returns were filed as single taxpayers. But
shortly before trial of this matter, debtors signed an undated notice of their vacating
the Hartford tenancy as “Bob and Tina Gaines.” This is the only document in evidence
where Tina used Robert’s surname.

The question of whether a couple is married at common law arises in many
different legal settings and is highly fact-intensive. Several cases illustrate this point.


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In Fleming v. Fleming, the parties divorced in 1969. Mrs. Fleming received an
alimony award that terminated upon her death or remarriage. She moved in with
another man, prompting Mr. Fleming to move to terminate his alimony obligation by
claiming she’d remarried. The state district court held that Mrs. Fleming and her
companion were not married as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding
that there was no evidence that the companion had undertaken to support Mrs.
Fleming or that there was any “present agreement” between them to be married. Her
cohabitation did not supply Mr. Fleming grounds to terminate his alimony

In Eaton v. Johnston, the Supreme Court considered the legal relationship of
a couple who were divorced in 1977 after a 20 year marriage, but who reestablished
a common residence together shortly thereafter, remaining together for another 30
months. They incorporated a business and jointly purchased a home. When they split
up again, Ms. Eaton filed an action seeking a declaration that she and Mr. Johnston
had not remarried or, in the alternative, for divorce. The state district court concluded
that Ms. Eaton had consistently denied the existence of a marriage agreement, that
on several occasions Mr. Johnston asked her to remarry him, and that they filed
separate tax returns as single taxpayers. Mr. Johnston was also involved with
another woman whom he told his family he planned to marry. On these facts, the
court concluded that no common law marriage had occurred and that the couple’s
property could not be divided under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1606 (now KAN. STAT. ANN.

38 221 Kan. 290, 293.


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§ 23-2706) which specifically applied to the division of marital property whether or
not a decree of divorce or separate maintenance was granted. The Supreme Court
affirmed this finding and held that the trial court had authority independent of § 601606
to divide the parties’ property.39

Another case in which the court found a lack of present marriage agreement is
Schrader v. Schrader.40 There, the parties divorced after just six years (and two
children), but again began living together, “this time without bothering with anything
so trivial as legal formalities.”41 They displayed some public characteristics of being
married, but their personal behavior toward each other and to the outside world
indicated otherwise. The court found that while the parties filed joint income tax
returns and lived together, there was no present understanding that they were
married. Mrs. Schrader testified that she didn’t formally marry Mr. Schrader again
because she wasn’t sure enough of their relationship to do so and would have an out
if things went badly again. Mr. Schrader corroborated this, stating that they agreed
to live together for their children and, if things worked out, they’d remarry. So, while
there was evidence of their holding themselves out as married, there was none of a
present intention to be married. The Supreme Court affirmed.42

These three cases suggest that the existence of a publicly visible and complex
joint living arrangement may satisfy the “holding out” factor, but is not enough to

39 Eaton v. Johnston, 235 Kan. 323, 328-29, 681 P.2d 606 (1984).
40 207 Kan. 349, 484 P.2d 1007 (1971), disapproved on other grounds by Eaton v.
Johnston, 235 Kan. 323, 681 P. 2d 606 (1984).
41 207 Kan. 349, 350.
42 Id. at 351.


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demonstrate a shared present intention to be married, particularly where the parties
have an “out” or their relationship is subject to a future contingency. The cases also
state that the parties cannot take actions or legal positions that suggest contrary
intent. These parties did.

Two pieces of documentary evidence are particularly damning to debtors’ claim
of a present marriage agreement necessary to establish a common law marriage.
First, Robert and Tina did not file tax returns as married people until they filed their
2014 returns, doing so long after this case was filed and long after the trustee had
filed her § 302 motion to dismiss, making it clear to debtors that she was challenging
their eligibility to be joint debtors. Even then, the 2014 returns offered in evidence
were amended returns that were filed in March of 2015 to reflect that they were
changing their filing status from single to “married filing separately,” and were
amended upon their attorney’s advice.43 Second, when they signed the DDP to obtain
health care coverage for Tina as a dependent under Robert’s employer’s plan, they
certified that they were “not married to each other.”44 This all occurred within a few
months of their filing this bankruptcy petition and, according to Robert, was the
definitive moment when he considered himself married to Tina. The inconsistency
here is that, according to the employer’s website, a “spouse” qualifies as a dependent
of the employee and is eligible for coverage under the employer’s health plan.45 Tina

43 See Ex. 6 and 7. No evidence was presented that debtors amended their filing status
for tax years 2012 or 2013.
44 See Ex. 8, p. 18.
45 Id. at p. 21.


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was not claimed as an eligible dependent as Robert’s spouse, but as his domestic
partner. Both he and she signed the DDP, suggesting that they did not consider
themselves to be married at this time. Nor did they offer any evidence that debtors
subsequently formed a present marriage agreement between May of 2014 and the
date of filing, July 31, 2014.

These are not the only proof problems, either. Further undercutting their
position is the testimony that Robert proposed to Tina in 2012 and that Tina testified
she sometime thinks they will get married eventually, suggesting that she doesn’t
think they’re married now. They do not consistently cohabitate. In fact, on the
petition date, Robert and Tina were living in towns 200 miles apart. Other than their
living in leased property together and purchasing a shed, there is no evidence of joint
economic activity. Nor is there any evidence that beyond placing her on the Phillips
health insurance plan as a domestic partner, Robert has actually undertaken to
provide Tina with support, though he clearly does support her. They did not prove
how, or even if they have combined their finances, whether they have ever affirmed
their commitment to each other in the presence of other witnesses, whether they have
exchanged rings, or if they have otherwise manifested the require present intent.
Proof that they have lived together prior to filing their bankruptcy and proof that
they intend to ultimately live together in Robert’s Oberlin home is insufficient to
establish a common law marriage. While I am persuaded that Robert and Tina may
hold themselves out as married, they failed to carry their burden to prove that they
presently intended to be married when the case was filed on July 31, 2014.


Case 14-11766 Doc# 54 Filed 05/14/15 Page 19 of 20

Because the debtors were not married on the petition date, this case cannot
proceed as a joint case.46 This leaves the debtors two alternatives. They can seek to
deconsolidate and proceed in separate chapter 13 cases. Failing that, I must deny
confirmation and dismiss the case because they are ineligible to proceed jointly and
therefore have not complied with the provisions of Title 11 and chapter 13, meaning
that they cannot demonstrate their compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). The
debtors shall have 14 days to file a motion to deconsolidate or their case will be
dismissed without further notice.

# # #

46 11 U.S.C. § 302.
Case 14-11766 Doc# 54 Filed 05/14/15 Page 20 of 20


11-11291 Rice (Doc. # 524)

In Re Rice, 11-11291 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 2, 2015) Doc. # 524

PDFClick here for the pdf document.

SIGNED this 2nd day of April, 2015.




IN RE: )
FREDERICK DEAN RICE, II ) Case No. 11-11291
) Chapter 11
Debtor. )



A creditor is bound by the terms of a confirmed chapter 11 plan whether it
objects to the plan or not. Property dealt with by the plan is, except as provided in
the plan, free and clear of all creditors’ claims and interests, unless those debts are
not dischargeable. In Kansas, unpaid ad valorem tax on real property is due and
payable on the first day of November and a lien for the tax attaches on that date. The
lien continues until all of the tax, and any interest and penalties, has been paid in


Case 11-11291 Doc# 524 Filed 04/02/15 Page 1 of 8

full. Ad valorem property tax claims are excepted from discharge only to the extent
they are accorded a priority under § 507(a)(8)(B) and that subsection limits priority
to only those taxes that could last be paid without penalty within one year of filing.

In this case, the debtor’s plan provided that certain of his rental real estate
would be sold and, because the rentals were in such distressed condition, the tax
claims against them would be allowed in one-half of the county’s valuation of the
various tracts and paid upon the sale of the tracts. Sedgwick County received notice
of the plan, but did not object to its confirmation. Now that the plan has been
confirmed, the County objects to the debtor’s motion to sell the tracts and pay its
claim as the plan provides.1 But, because the County did not object to the plan, it is
bound by its terms. The reorganized debtor received the property free and clear of the
County’s claims, except as the plan provided. Sedgwick County’s sale objection must
be overruled.2


This is a core proceeding over which the Court may exercise subject matter


Frederick Rice filed a chapter 13 case on May 3, 2011; the case was
subsequently converted to chapter 11. Mr. Rice has suffered from mental illness for

1 Dkt. 475 (Sale No. 3 Motion), 482 (Sedgwick County’s Objection).
2 The debtor/guardian ad litem (GAL) Calvin Wiebe appears by counsel W. Thomas
Gilman. Creditor Sedgwick County appears by Sedgwick County Counselor Patricia

J. Parker.
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A), (N), (O); 28 U.S.C. § 1334.

Case 11-11291 Doc# 524 Filed 04/02/15 Page 2 of 8

a number of years. Early on, the Court appointed Calvin L. Wiebe as guardian ad
litem (GAL) to protect Mr. Rice’s interests in this case.4

Mr. Rice’s chapter 11 plan provided that his assets would be liquidated and his
claims paid down so that income on the remaining assets could amortize the
remaining debt and pay Mr. Rice’s living expenses.5 That plan was properly noticed
to the creditors and confirmed on July 23, 2014.6 Sedgwick County, whose rights were
altered by the plan, but who failed to object to its confirmation, now objects to the
debtor’s motion to sell real property free and clear of its ad valorem tax liens as the
plan provided.7 Because the order confirming the debtor’s plan is final, Sedgwick
County is bound by its terms and its objection to the sale must be overruled.

One of Mr. Rice’s businesses involved buying and renting houses, sometimes
with conventional financing and sometimes on contracts for deed. When Rice’s health
worsened, he lost the ability to keep track of these houses and many suffered from
substantial deferred maintenance. He also let the ad valorem taxes on these
properties lapse. In the plan, the GAL contended that Sedgwick County had
significantly overvalued some of the properties and that a substantial portion of the
taxes owed to the County were unsecured. The GAL proposed to sell these properties

4 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1004.1; Dkt. 67.
5 Dkt. 405.
6 See Dkt. 409 (September 9, 2013 certificate of service of plan, disclosure statement,
ballot, and notice to creditors, on Sedgwick County); Dkt. 463.
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 363; Dkt. 475 (Motion for Sale No. 3); Dkt. 482 (Sedgwick County’s


Case 11-11291 Doc# 524 Filed 04/02/15 Page 3 of 8

free and clear of any liens and to allow the County’s secured claims at one-half of the

total of taxes, interest, and penalties due on each tract.8

Part V of the Plan clearly articulates what the GAL intended to do in

connection with overvalued properties with large tax claims. He stated that he would

continue to offer these properties for sale under § 363 and allow Sedgwick County’s

claims at one-half of the outstanding taxes due—

To the Sedgwick County Treasurer for one-half of the outstanding ad
valorem taxes due on the Unproductive Real Estate as each parcel of
the Unproductive Real Estate is sold. Sedgwick County will accept
one-half of the ad valorem taxes in full satisfaction of its claim to such taxes
on each parcel of the Unproductive Real Estate as those parcels are sold.
Sedgwick County has been accruing ad valorem taxes on the parcels ofUnproductive Real Estate using values (based on the deteriorated conditionof the Unproductive Real Estate) that are significantly overstated.9

The reduced taxes were to be paid second after direct costs of sale. This plan

was filed on September 3, 2013 and the disclosure statement approved.10 The GAL

balloted the plan and, on July 23, 2014, it was confirmed.11 The County did not object

to confirmation nor did it file a rejecting ballot. The County did file a proof of claim

on June 27, 2011.12 Now the GAL seeks to sell these overvalued properties as the plan

contemplated and the County has objected to the sale motion, arguing that the

8 See Dkt. 405, §§ 5.1-5.3, pp. 15-17.
9 Dkt. 405, pp. 15-16.
10 Dkt. 458 (Order approving Disclosure Statement). See also, Dkt. 423 (Courtroom
minute sheet from hearing October 10, 2013).
11 Dkt. 463. See also, Dkt. 448 (Courtroom minute sheet from confirmation hearing
held March 18, 2014).
12 See Claim No. 5 – claim for real estate taxes in amount of $21,804 for tax years
2006-2010 on various properties; the County designated the claim as secured and as
an unsecured priority claim but did not state what portion of the claim was entitled
to priority.


Case 11-11291 Doc# 524 Filed 04/02/15 Page 4 of 8

debtor’s obligation to pay these taxes is excepted from his discharge and that the tax
claims cannot be allowed as the plan suggests.13 At a preliminary hearing on this
motion to sell, the Court directed that the sales go forward, but that funds remaining
after payment of the sale’s direct costs, be held pending its order on the County’s
objection. To that end, the Court directed the parties to submit stipulations regarding
the completed Sale No. 3 results. Several of the tracts garnered sufficient sales
proceeds to pay the County more than one-half of the tax due on them.14


Whether Sedgwick County is bound by the provisions of the confirmed plan
that allowed its secured claims in a reduced amount depends upon whether it
received appropriate notice of the plan in time to request to be heard. The County
says that the notice of the plan was internally misdirected, depriving it of an
opportunity to object and be heard. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(b) requires that notice of
the plan, along with an accompanying disclosure statement, be served on all creditors
and parties in interest in a case and that they should have 28 days to file an objection.
Notices are to be mailed to creditors at an address they request. Rule 2002(g)(1)(A)
provides that when a creditor files a proof of claim that designates a mailing address,
that filing represents a filed request for mailed notice at that address. The parties
here agree that the GAL mailed the plan, disclosure statement, and notice to creditors

13 Dkt. 475 (Sale No. 3 Motion); Dkt. 482 (Objection). The GAL filed a detailed
response to the County’s objection. Dkt. 483.
14 See Dkt. 501 and 503 (Stipulations regarding Sale No. 3).


Case 11-11291 Doc# 524 Filed 04/02/15 Page 5 of 8

to the County at the address shown on its proof of claim.15 Service of the notice was
therefore sufficient.

The County didn’t object and the plan, containing the treatment of which it
belatedly complains, was confirmed. As § 1141(a) provides, a confirmed plan binds all
creditors whether or not they have accepted the plan. The GAL’s plan provided for
the debtor’s property to remain in the bankruptcy estate at confirmation while the
GAL determined whether to liquidate it or to retain it in the Trust established under
the plan for the debtor’s care and maintenance. Once confirmation occurs, § 1141(c)
states that the property of the estate is free and clear of all claims and interests of
creditors except to the extent those creditor’s debts were somehow excepted from the
debtor’s discharge under § 1141(d)(2). Section 1141(d)(2) incorporates any debt
excepted from discharge under § 523.16

It is this latter provision, specifically § 523(a)(1)(A), upon which the County
relies in its objection to the GAL’s Sale No. 3. The County says that its real property
tax claims should be excepted from Rice’s discharge and that the properties they
burden should remain subject to property tax liens in the original, not the adjusted,
amounts. This argument fails for two reasons.

First, the only part of the tax claim that would be excepted from discharge is
the property tax that came due for 2009 and 2010. The debtor owed unpaid ad

15 See Dkt. 409 with attached matrix, p.3 and Claim No. 5.
16 Section 523(a)(1)(A) in turn references taxes of the kind specified in § 507(a)(8).
Property taxes are among the kind of taxes included in subpart (B) of § 507(a)(8).


Case 11-11291 Doc# 524 Filed 04/02/15 Page 6 of 8

valorem taxes dating from 2006.17 He didn’t file this case until May 1, 2011. At that

time, his 2009 ad valorem taxes were last payable without penalty on May 10, 2010

and his 2010 taxes were payable on the same date in 2011. Section 523(a)(1) only

excepts from discharge the priority portion of a tax claim allowable under §

507(a)(8)(B). That subsection only grants priority status to ad valorem tax claims that

were payable without penalty a year before the date of the petition. As the GAL notes,

only the 2009 and 2010 taxes could be eligible for priority treatment; the other years

are properly classified as secured claims.18

Second, and of ultimate importance here, the County failed to object to the

plan’s confirmation. With that confirmation, the allowance of the County’s secured

claims became final and binding on the County. As numerous courts have held, once

17 In Kansas, real estate taxes become due and a lien automatically attaches to the
real estate on November 1 for each year that taxes are levied. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 791804
(1997). Section 79-2004(a) (2014 Supp.) permits the taxpayer to either pay the
full amount on December 20 or may opt to pay one-half on December 20 and the
remaining one-half on May 10 of the next year.
18 Though it seems unlikely, we need not decide whether the debtor has personal
liability for these priority taxes after discharge today because, in an individual
chapter 11 case, the debtor does not receive a discharge until completion of all plan
payments; confirmation of the plan does not discharge any debt provided for in the
plan. See Bd. of Comm'rs of Ness Cnty. v. Hopper, 110 Kan. 501, 204 P. 536 (1922)
(absent statutory provision so stating, title holder has no personal liability for any
deficiency after tax foreclosure sale); see also § 1141(d)(5).The effect of confirmationunder this debtor’s plan is expressly made “[s]ubject to the limitations of 11 U.S.C. §
1141(d).” See Dkt. 405, p. 23, § 9.1. See also In re Artisan Woodworkers, 225 B.R.
185, 190-91 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (Confirmed chapter 11 plan may not extinguish or
discharge an otherwise nondischargeable debt, even when creditor fails toparticipate in plan confirmation process); In re Newman, 399 B.R. 541, 547 (Bankr.

M.D. Fla. 2008) (individual chapter 11 plan that was confirmed did not extinguish
otherwise nondischargeable debt, even where the debt was provided for in the plan);
In re DePaolo, 45 F.3d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1995).

Case 11-11291 Doc# 524 Filed 04/02/15 Page 7 of 8

a creditor receives appropriate notice and fails to act, and once the plan is confirmed,
the creditor is bound by its terms and may no longer enforce its pre-confirmation


Sedgwick County’s objection to the GAL’s Motion for Sale No. 3 is therefore
overruled; the GAL is authorized to distribute the proceeds of the sale of the contested
tracts as set out in the confirmed plan and Notice of Sale.

# # #

19 In re American Properties, Inc., 30 B.R. 239, 246-47 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); United
States v. Victor, 121 F.3d 1383, 1387-88 (10th Cir. 1997) (tax discharge exceptionand statute governing priority of allowed unsecured tax claims inapplicable to
secured tax claims and therefore tax creditor with secured tax claim who did not
object to confirmation was bound by confirmed chapter 11 plan).


Case 11-11291 Doc# 524 Filed 04/02/15 Page 8 of 8

14-05192 Ledin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Doc. # 44)

Ledin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 14-05192 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2015) Doc. # 44

PDFClick here for the pdf document.

SIGNED this 31st day of March, 2015.




IN RE: )
JONATHAN EDWARD LEDIN, ) Case No. 14-12347
) Chapter 7

 Debtor )

Plaintiff ) Adv. No. 14-5192
v. )

 Defendant. )


When a party brings an action based upon a claim that has been previously
litigated and resolved between the same parties and on the same grounds, that claim


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 1 of 10

is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.1 For this doctrine to apply, the new action
must involve the same claim, the same parties, claims that were or could have been
raised, and a final judgment on the merits. If those four elements are met, the new
action must be dismissed. In this case, Jonathan Ledin asks this court to enter a
judgment finding that the mortgage that encumbers his homestead has been canceled
and should be released. He bases this claim on the mortgagee having previously
issued a 1099-C Cancellation of Debt (COD) notice to his late father, in connection
with a note his father signed that was secured by the mortgage. When a creditor
forgives or cancels a debt, the cancelled debt is generally income to the debtor. The
creditor reports that income to the Internal Revenue Service by issuing a 1099-C

Prior to his bankruptcy Ledin filed a state court lawsuit in Reno County
District Court seeking essentially the same relief he seeks here: to quiet title to his
home by way of a court order that the mortgage be released. The state court entered
a judgment denying that relief and finding that the mortgage remained a valid and
enforceable lien on his property, notwithstanding that the underlying personal
indebtedness had been cancelled. Ledin also filed a similar suit in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Kansas, seeking the same relief. The District Court dismissed
that action when it found that his claims were precluded by the prior state court
determination. Now Ledin has filed the same or a very similar action here and Wells

1 See Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Authority, 242 Kan. 683, 690-91, 751 P.2d
122 (1988) (discussing claim preclusion and issue preclusion aspects of res judicata doctrine).


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 2 of 10

Fargo again seeks dismissal on res judicata grounds. Because this adversary
proceeding involves the same claims and parties as the prior actions did, and because
final judgments on the merits have been entered in both the state court Reno County
action and the federal District Court case, Ledin’s adversary complaint must be

Rule 12(b)(6) Standards3

In determining whether Ledin’s complaint states a claim upon which relief
may be granted, I assess whether the factual allegations give rise to a cause of action
against Wells Fargo that is plausible on its face. The question is whether the
complaint contains facts sufficient to support these claims, not whether Ledin will
ultimately prevail on those claims.4 The plaintiff must allege enough facts to support
a claim that is plausible on its face.5 The plausibility standard is less than a
probability but more than a sheer possibility that Ledin is entitled to the relief

For purposes of this motion, I take the facts pled in Ledin’s complaint as true.7

2 Wells Fargo Bank appears by its counsel Cassandra L. Writz. Plaintiff Jonathan Edward
Ledin appears pro se.
3 Motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are made applicable to adversary
proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012.
4 Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (In ruling on a motion to dismissthe judge must accept all allegations as true and may not dismiss on the basis that it appearsunlikely the allegations can be proven.).
5 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (enough facts must be alleged to
nudge the claim across the line from conceivable to plausible).
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
7 Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (In reviewingthe sufficiency of the complaint, the court assumes the truth of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.); Mobley v.
McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994) (A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 3 of 10

In addition, I may consider the exhibits or attachments to Wells Fargo’s and Ledin’s

briefs without converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).8 Specifically, I can take judicial notice of petitions, orders,

journal entries, or other pleadings from the prior state and federal court cases, as

referenced below, all of which were attached to either Wells Fargo’s memorandum of

law in support of its motion to dismiss or Ledin’s responsive brief.9 At a related

hearing held in this adversary proceeding on February 12, 2015, Ledin authenticated

these outside pleadings and judicial records by confirming on the record in open court

that they were genuine copies of the originals filed in or issued by those courts,

thereby lending them suitable for my taking judicial notice of them.


In May of 2007, Jonathan Ledin received a deed to real property in Hutchinson,

Kansas from the trustee of his parents’ living trust after his father, Charles Ledin,

died. Before Charles died, he granted a mortgage on the Hutchinson property to Wells

the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after accepting as true all well-
pleaded factual allegations.).
8 See Navajo Nation v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157 (D.N.M. 2013)
(Conversion of motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment is not required under Rule
12(d), where court can properly take judicial notice of the extra-pleading materials); J.P.
Morgan Trust Co. Nat. Ass'n v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257-58, 126061
(D. Kan. 2006). See also, Hausler v. Felton, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1329 (N.D. Okla. 2010)
aff'd, 457 Fed. Appx. 727 (10th Cir. 2012) (determining claim preclusion on motion to dismiss
by taking judicial notice of pleadings and orders in previous cases); Lester v. Minnesota Life
Ins. Co., 2014 WL 5601078 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 3, 2014) (res judicata case); Grynberg v. Koch
Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004).
9 Id. See Q Int'l Courier, Inc. v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 216 (4th Cir.2006) (“When entertaining
a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, a court may take judicial notice of facts
from a prior judicial proceeding when the res judicata defense raises no disputed issue of
fact.”). See also Dkt. 13 (Wells Fargo’s brief) and Dkt. 16 (Ledin’s brief)


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 4 of 10

Fargo to secure repayment of a promissory note. Jonathan’s deed came subject to that
mortgage. Sometime in 2007, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure petition in the Reno
County District Court, seeking to enforce the mortgage, but dismissed that case
without prejudice on June 24, 2008.10 Then, in 2008, and again in 2011, Wells Fargo
issued two COD notices to Charles Ledin. Jonathan claims that these notices amount
to a cancellation of Charles’ debt and Wells Fargo is required to release the mortgage
that encumbers what is now Jonathan’s homestead.

Jonathan first filed a quiet title action in Reno County District Court in 2009
seeking an order that would require Wells Fargo to release the mortgage. He based
his claim on Wells Fargo’s having failed to foreclose its mortgage.11 He attached to
that petition a copy of the Reno County court’s dismissal order in the 2007 foreclosure
case, a copy of his letter demanding that the mortgage be released, and a copy of a
COD notice addressed to Charles Ledin. On August 13, 2010, the state court issued
a Journal Entry finding that “the indebtedness secured by the mortgage has not been
paid and the mortgage remains unreleased. Said mortgage is a valid and enforceable
lien encumbering the subject real estate . . . .”12 The Court entered judgment against
Jonathan and in favor of Wells Fargo.13

10 Dkt. 13-1, pp. 14-16 (Case No. 07 CV 642, Order Dismissing Case).
11 Dkt. 13-1, pp. 1-4 (Case No. 09 CV 315, Quiet Title Petition).
12 Dkt. 13-1, pp. 22-23 (Case No. 09 CV 315, Journal Entry of Judgment).
13 Ledin appealed the judgment to the Kansas Court of Appeals but it was dismissed on April
26, 2011 after the parties entered into a settlement agreement, Ledin breached its terms, and
the Court of Appeals, in confirming the settlement agreement, dismissed the appeal. See Dkt.
13-1, p. 30. On January 20, 2012, the Kansas Supreme Court denied Ledin’s petition for
review. See Dkt. 13-1, p. 31. The judgment in the 2009 quiet title case is, in any event, final.


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 5 of 10

On May 15, 2012, Jonathan filed a second action against Wells Fargo in Reno
County alleging that Wells Fargo was required to release the mortgage by the
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 and certain IRS regulations.14 He also
pleaded a tort claim for “wrongful foreclosure,” seeking $180 million in damages. This
action was dismissed with prejudice by agreement of the parties on June 29, 2012.15

On January 3, 2014, Jonathan filed an action in the U.S. District Court,
alleging in somewhat more detail that after Wells Fargo issued the CODs, it was
required by the provisions of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 and
attendant regulations to release its mortgage.16 He also sought damages for “tax
fraud” and now claimed $180 billion in damages. The District Court dismissed that
action on February 28, 2014, finding that the claims raised in the federal court
complaint were identical to those pled in the Reno County actions, that they had been
litigated among the same parties, and that they had been considered on the merits
and rejected.17

Ledin brought this adversary proceeding in his chapter 7 case filed here on
October 14, 2014. That complaint recites what Ledin has claimed before, that Wells
Fargo should be compelled to release the mortgage because it has forgiven Charles
Ledin’s indebtedness and that the release is required by the Internal Revenue Code
and corresponding federal regulations. He again asserts a claim for “tax fraud” based

14Dkt. 13-1, pp. 35-62 (Case No. 12 CV 224, “Petition for . . . Illegal and Fraudulent
15 Dkt. 13-1, p. 79 (Case No. 12 CV 224, Order of Dismissal).
16 Dkt. 13-1, pp. 80-100 (Civil Action No. 14-1004-MLB, Civil Complaint).
17 Dkt. 13-1, pp. 101-105 (Civil Action No. 14-1004-MLB, Memorandum and Order).


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 6 of 10

upon Wells Fargo’s violations of the income reporting regulation, § 1.6050P-1. He also
alleges that the mortgage lien may be avoided as judicial lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
Wells Fargo filed its motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that this action is
barred by res judicata.18


Res Judicata

Ledin’s claim for release of the mortgage is barred by res judicata. That
doctrine bars repeated litigation of claims between parties that have already been
tried and decided in earlier proceedings. Here, Ledin asked both the Reno County
state court and the federal District Court to find that because Wells Fargo forgave
his late father’s personal obligation it was required to release the mortgage that
secured that obligation. In the 2009 action, the Reno County court declined to do that,
finding that the mortgage was still valid and enforceable. The U.S. District Court
concluded that the 2009 decision was res judicata on the point. Nothing presented in
the current complaint would warrant my concluding differently. Because Ledin’s
action is barred by res judicata, it is not facially plausible that he could prevail on it.
He has failed to state a claim and that part of the complaint must therefore be

In Rem Liability

Even if Ledin’s claim isn’t barred by res judicata, it is legally implausible
because it is grounded in a fundamental misunderstanding of Kansas mortgage law.

18 Dkt. 13.


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 7 of 10

The fact that Wells Fargo may not have pursued Ledin’s late father personally on his
note in no way eviscerates its right to pursue payment of the obligation from the land
his father encumbered as collateral for that note. This point has been well established
by the Kansas appellate courts for many years and recognizes that the holder of a
promissory note secured by a mortgage may choose not to pursue the maker of the
note personally, but still retains the right to recover its debt in rem, or against the
land, by enforcing the mortgage.19 Wells Fargo has no personal claim against either
Ledin or his father anymore, but, like any mortgagee whose collateral has been
conveyed subject to the mortgage, it may still foreclose the mortgage or assert a lien
on the proceeds of the real estate should Ledin sell it voluntarily. Even if this were
the first time that Ledin had pled his claim and res judicata did not apply, he has
shown no legal basis for invalidating Wells Fargo’s mortgage, rendering the relief he
seeks implausible.

Internal Revenue Code § 108

Also legally inaccurate is Ledin’s characterization of his “rights” under the
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act. Enacted in 2007 in response to the growing

19 See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Howie, 47 Kan. App. 2d 690, 693-94, 280 P.3d 225 (2012) (court
rejected claim of borrower’s widow that lender was barred from foreclosing its mortgage,
arguing that the mortgage debt was extinguished by the lender’s failure to demand paymenton note after borrower’s death, where mortgage existed at the date of borrower’s death; lenderwas only pursuing in rem relief). See also, Garnett State Sav. Bank v. Tush, 232 Kan. 447,
657 P.2d 508 (1983) (Under Kansas law, while discharge in bankruptcy will prevent debtor
from being personally liable on dischargeable debt, creditor holding security interest in
exempt property may look to that property for satisfaction of debt.); Korb v. Minneapolis
Threshing Mach. Co., 133 Kan. 783, 3 P.2d 502, 505 (1931) (noting that the personal liability
of the mortgagor may be released without extinguishing the mortgage).


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 8 of 10

financial crisis of that time, this Act amended the provisions of § 108(a)(1)(E) of the
Internal Revenue Code to provide that a taxpayer’s gross income doesn’t include,
among other things “discharged qualified principal residence indebtedness.”20
Qualified “principal residence indebtedness” is defined in § 108(h)(2) as acquisition
indebtedness, (i.e., purchase money debt secured by the home), that the taxpayer
incurred to purchase or build her home. If a taxpayer loses her home in foreclosure,
but the foreclosure sale of the home does not bring enough to liquidate the debt, if the
lender forgives the remaining balance, that cancelled debt is not income to the
taxpayer debtor. Prior to the enactment of this amendment, it was. Nothing in § 108
or 26 C.F.R. §1.6050P-1 requires the lender to release mortgages upon cancellation
of the underlying debt. That regulation merely governs how and when the
cancellation of debt is to be reported to the IRS.21 It does not establish penalties or
provide for money damages for violations. Nor does it establish a claim for “tax fraud.”
So neither § 108 nor § 1.6050P-1 supply a basis for a facially plausible claim.

Lien Avoidance, § 522(f)(1)

Now that Ledin is in bankruptcy, he claims that this court can avoid the
mortgage as a judgment lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A). That section provides
that a debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien that impairs an exemption if the lien is a
“judicial lien.” A “judicial lien” is defined in § 101(36) of the Bankruptcy Code as a
lien obtained by judgment or other legal or equitable process. Thus, the soul of a

20 26 U.S.C. § 108 (2014). See Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, § 2, 121 STAT.
1803 (2007); H.R. 3648, 110th Cong., § 2 (Dec. 14, 2007), 2007 Cong. US HR 3648 (Westlaw).
21 See I.R.C. § 6050P


Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 9 of 10

judicial lien is that it is imposed by a court, not created consensually the way a
mortgage is. Ledin believes that the journal entry entered in the 2009 Reno County
case, the one that found that the mortgage remained valid, somehow transformed
that lien into a judicial lien. It didn’t. That judgment merely found that the mortgage
remained enforceable. It did not purport to foreclose it. And, even if Wells Fargo had
obtained a foreclosure judgment concerning this mortgage, foreclosure judgments are
specifically excepted from the judicial lien avoidance statute by § 522(f)(2)(C) which
provides that the judicial lien avoidance power does not extend to “a judgment arising
out of a mortgage foreclosure.”22 Section 522(f)(1) affords Ledin no plausible source of
legal relief and the Court in any event has already rejected the claim in this adversary


Having failed to either plead a facially plausible claim for relief or a claim that
has not previously been adjudicated, Ledin’s complaint must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim. A separate judgment of dismissal shall be issued this same day.

# # #

22 See also In re Nichols, 265 B.R. 831 (10th Cir. BAP 2001) (consensual mortgage lien was not
transformed into judicial lien by virtue of state court’s foreclosure decree); In re Ruck, 451

B.R. 128, 131-32 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011) (even if mortgage “merged” into foreclosure decree, it
did not convert consensual lien of mortgage to judicial lien).
23 Ledin brought this identical § 522(f)(1) avoidance claim by separate motion filed on
November 17, 2014. See Adv. Dkt. 4. The Court denied the motion on the same basis as set
forth above – the mortgage lien was not a judicial lien subject to avoidance under that statute.
See Adv. Dkt. 27.

Case 14-05192 Doc# 44 Filed 03/31/15 Page 10 of 10

14-10847 Bibbs (Doc. # 51)

In Re Bibbs, 14-10847 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2015) Doc. # 51

PDFClick here for the pdf document.

SIGNED this 31st day of March, 2015.




Case No. 14-10847
Chapter 13



To determine the meaning of the term “purchase money security interest” as
that term is used in the hanging paragraph after 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9)(*), courts look
look first to that term’s familiar definition in the Uniform Commercial Code.1 As
enacted in Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103 provides that a security interest attains

1 In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 829 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), aff’d 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir.
2009)(direct appeal).


Case 14-10847 Doc# 51 Filed 03/31/15 Page 1 of 7

attains purchase-money status to the extent the goods in question are “purchase“
purchase-money collateral.”2 “Purchase-money collateral,” in turn, includes goods that
that secure a “purchase-money obligation”3 and a “purchase-money obligation” is one
one for “value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in . . . the collateral if the
value is in fact so used.”4 Section 1325(a)(9)(*) provides that if a debtor incurred a debt
debt to purchase a motor vehicle for personal use within 910 days of the date of filing
filing and granted a purchase-money security interest to secure repayment of the loan,
loan, the bifurcation provisions of § 506 no longer apply to that debt, meaning that the
the creditor’s allowed claim must be paid in full without regard to the collateral’s

In the present case, Donita Bibbs borrowed money to buy her Toyota on October
13, 2011 and granted K-State Federal Credit Union a purchase money security interest
in the car. On October 23, 2012, she executed a new note that modified the old debt by
permitting her to make bi-weekly payments rather than monthly payments. She filed
this case on April 21, 2014, 921 days after first incurring the debt, but KSFCU claims
that because of her subsequent refinance during the 910-day counting period, she
cannot bifurcated its claim. Ms. Bibbs “incurred” the purchase-money debt more than
910 days prior to filing her case. KSFCU’s claim is therefore not entitled to “910” status
and its objection to confirmation is overruled.

2 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103(b) (2014 Supp.).
3 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103(a)(1) (2014 Supp.).
4 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103(a)(2) (2014 Supp.).


Case 14-10847 Doc# 51 Filed 03/31/15 Page 2 of 7


A proceeding for confirmation of a plan is a core proceeding over which this
Court may exercise jurisdiction.5


Ms. Bibbs executed a Loanliner agreement with KSFCU on October 13, 2011.
She borrowed $6,852, $6,000 of which was directly disbursed to a dealer to allow Ms.
Bibbs to buy a 2002 Toyota Camry. The purpose of the loan is noted on the face of the
instrument—“purchase vehicle.” She agreed to make $250 monthly payments over 39
months. The balance of the loan funds paid the premium for GAP insurance, car titling
fees, and a $500 deposit into her account for personal use. On October 23, 2012, Ms.
Bibbs signed another Loanliner agreement with KSFCU to refinance $6,266.44,
payable at the same interest rate (18%), but in 65 bi-weekly $125 payments rather
than $250 monthly payments. The Camry remained the only collateral for this loan
and Ms. Bibbs received no additional funds under this agreement. Ms. Bibbs filed this
case on April 21, 2014, within 910 days of the latter agreement, but 921 days after the
first one.

In her first plan, Ms. Bibbs proposed to treat KSFCU’s claim as a “910” claim
and to pay KSFCU in full.6 The chapter 13 trustee objected, noting that the loan was

5 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(L) and § 1334. The chapter 13 trustee and securedcar creditor submit this matter to the Court on stipulation of facts (Dkt. 40) andbriefs (Dkt. 41 and 42). Chapter 13 trustee Laurie B. Williams appears by counselKarin N. Amyx and K-State Federal Credit Union appears by its attorney Martha

A. Peterson.
6 Dkt. 12.

Case 14-10847 Doc# 51 Filed 03/31/15 Page 3 of 7

was not a purchase money loan, and that debtor improperly classified and paid the
claim as a 910 car loan pursuant to the hanging paragraph of § 1325(a)(9)(*).7 Ms.
Bibbs amended her plan to provide for the traditional treatment of a non-910 car loan,
loan, bifurcating KSFCU’s claim between a $3,000 allowed secured claim, leaving the
the balance unsecured.8 KSFCU objects, claiming that the original loan was a purchase
purchase money loan and that by refinancing the debt within the 910 day window, it
it should be entitled to fully secured treatment under the hanging paragraph.9 The
Trustee responded that the original Loanliner agreement was outside the 910 day
period and this loan started the 910 counting period for the purpose of 910 car status.10


A glance at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103 tells us that a “purchase-money
obligation” is one the borrower incurs for value given to “enable the debtor to acquire
acquire rights in” the collateral and that “purchase-money collateral” consists of goods
goods that secure a purchase-money obligation.11 In simple terms, if a lender loans
money to a debtor to purchase a car and that loan is secured by the car, the security
interest is a purchase money security interest [PMSI].

Congress enacted § 1325(a)(9)(*) in 2005.12 It requires debtors who had borrowed

7 Dkt. 22.
8 Dkt. 27.
9 Dkt. 30. KSFCU did not dispute the debtor’s $3,000 value of the car in its objection
to confirmation.
10 Dkt. 32.
11 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103(a) (2014 Supp.).
12 This cited paragraph immediately follows § 1325(a)(9) and is commonly referred


Case 14-10847 Doc# 51 Filed 03/31/15 Page 4 of 7

borrowed money to purchase a vehicle for personal, family or household use within 910

910 days of the petition date to pay their car loan in full, regardless of the car’s value.

value. It accomplished this by making the provisions of § 506, which separates ordinary

ordinary secured claims into allowed secured and unsecured claims according to the

collateral’s value, inapplicable to these “recent” purchase-money loans.13 The so-called

so-called hanging paragraph states—

For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim
described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money security
security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the
debt was incurred within the 910–day period preceding the date of the
filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motorvehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal
personal use of the debtor....14

In order for the loan to qualify for this favorable treatment in chapter 13, it has to have
been “incurred” within the 910 day look-back.

KSFCU argues that when Ms. Bibbs signed the refinancing note in 2012, she
“incurred” a purchase-money obligation within the look-back period. That she incurred
incurred an “obligation” within 910 days of filing is accurate; that the obligation was
was for “purchase-money” is not. She incurred a “purchase-money obligation” in
October of 2011, 921 days before she filed this case. Nothing that happened in October
October of 2012 altered the effect of the PMSI she granted in 2011. KAN. STAT. ANN. §
§ 84-9-103(f) codifies the “dual status rule” by providing that the renewal or

to as the “hanging paragraph” because it is unnumbered and modifies § 1325(a)(5).
13 In re Ford, 574 F.3d 1279, 1281.
14 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9)(*), emphasis added.


Case 14-10847 Doc# 51 Filed 03/31/15 Page 5 of 7

refinancing of a purchase money obligation does not cause the PMSI to lose its status.15
status.15 The very modest change in these parties’ relationship effected by the second
second note in no way affected the purchase-money status that was created by the first
first note and security agreement. Ms. Bibbs “incurred” the purchase-money obligation
obligation when she bought the car, not when she signed the 2012 refinance note and §
and § 1325(a)(9)(*) pegs the 910-day counting period to when “the debt was incurred.”

No bankruptcy court has sided with KSFCU’s position and at least two have
held to the contrary. In In re Naumann, the court considered whether the nature of the
the refinanced obligation had changed from the original one enough to consider the
second note a novation as a matter of Illinois law.16 The court there noted that the loan
loan refinancing date was not the controlling date for determining whether to apply the
the hanging paragraph. Rather, the date upon which the obligation is “incurred,” as
both the UCC and Bankruptcy Code provisions say, is the date of the original
purchase-money loan.17 In In re Cunningham, the court looked to the definitions of
“purchase-money obligation” and “purchase-money security interest” in North
Carolina’s version of UCC § 9-103 to conclude that the date the purchase-money loan is
loan is made is the controlling date for determining when the 910 day look-back period

15 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103(f)(3) (2014 Supp.). Likewise, the dual status doctrine
provides that PMSI status is not lost by the fact the car secured the full loan
obligation, including loan proceeds that were used for items other than the car
purchase money obligation. See § 84-9-103(f)(1).
16 In re Naumann, 2010 WL 2293477 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. June 8, 2010).
17 Id. at *4, n. 5.


Case 14-10847 Doc# 51 Filed 03/31/15 Page 6 of 7

period begins, not the date of refinancing.18 I agree with the reasoning in Naumann
and Cunningham and conclude that Kansas’s version of § 9-103 requires me to reach
reach the same conclusion here. Because Ms. Bibbs incurred the purchase money
obligation more than 910 days before filing her bankruptcy petition she is not required
required to treat KSFCU as a 910-car creditor under § 1325(a)(9)(*) and may pay the
the $3,000 value of the car as proposed in her amended plan.

KSFCU’s objection to Donita Bibbs’ amended chapter 13 plan is OVERRULED.
The trustee is directed to submit a confirmation order accordingly.
# # #

18 In re Cunningham, 2012 WL 1604686 at *3 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. May 8, 2012).


Case 14-10847 Doc# 51 Filed 03/31/15 Page 7 of 7

14-05192 Ledin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Doc. # 41)

Ledin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 14-05192 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 27, 2015) Doc. # 41

PDFClick here for the pdf document.

SIGNED this 27th day of March, 2015.




IN RE: )
JONATHAN EDWARD LEDIN, ) Case No. 14-12347
) Chapter 7

 Debtor )

Plaintiff ) Adv. No. 14-5192
v. )

 Defendant. )


28 U.S.C. § 455 governs recusal of a bankruptcy judge. Recusal is required if a
reasonable person knowing all of the relevant facts would harbor doubts about the


Case 14-05192 Doc# 41 Filed 03/27/15 Page 1 of 8

judge’s impartiality. But where the only facts presented are that the judge has issued
a ruling in the case adverse to the movant, the judge is not required to disqualify
himself. Because Mr. Ledin asserts no other facts that support disqualification
beyond my ruling that a disputed mortgage lien against his property was not a
judicial lien subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A), Ledin’s motion for
recusal must be denied.

 Factual Background

Jonathan Ledin filed his chapter 7 bankruptcy case pro se on October 14, 2014.
Originally noticed as a no-asset case, it was re-noticed as a potential asset case on
December 16, 2014 and a claims bar date of March 27, 2015 was set. Ledin scheduled
creditor Wells Fargo on Schedule D with a disputed secured claim by virtue of a
mortgage lien. As of March 26, Wells Fargo has not filed a proof of claim.

In this adversary proceeding Ledin alleges that Wells Fargo is “illegally
maintaining a mortgage lien” against Plaintiff’s real property that he claims exempt
in his bankruptcy as his homestead. Plaintiff’s father granted the Wells Fargo
mortgage and, after he died, Ledin inherited the property. Ledin claims that when
Wells Fargo issued a Form 1099-C to his father’s estate, it forgave his father’s
mortgage debt and “statutorily cancels” it, entitling him to the release of the mortgage
lien. He relies on the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, an amendment to § 108
of the Internal Revenue Code, to support this claim. He also seeks to avoid the
mortgage lien under various provisions of § 522.1 Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss

1 Adv. Dkt. 1.


Case 14-05192 Doc# 41 Filed 03/27/15 Page 2 of 8

for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis of the doctrine
of res judicata, which plaintiff opposes.2 That motion remains under advisement, but
will be decided shortly.3

So far, the only ruling I have made in this adversary proceeding is an order
denying Ledin’s separate Motion to Avoid Lien brought under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).4
Ledin filed that motion with his adversary complaint. Wells Fargo objected to the
motion and, in accordance with this Court’s procedures, the motion was set for a nonevidentiary
hearing on the Court’s regular monthly motion docket on January 8,
2015. After reviewing the motion and objection, and hearing the arguments of Ledin
and counsel for Wells Fargo, I denied the motion because § 522(f)(1)(A) only provides
for avoidance of judicial liens that impair an exemption. “Judicial lien” is a defined
term in the bankruptcy code and refers to liens that are imposed by judgments or
other court orders.5 Because Ledin’s late father granted Wells Fargo’s mortgage lien,
it is a consensual lien and not a “judicial lien.” This Court has no power to avoid a
consensual lien under § 522(f)(1).

I directed that counsel for Wells Fargo prepare the journal entry on my ruling.
Counsel drafted and serve the proposed order on Ledin under D. Kan. L.B.R. 9074.1,
to which he promptly filed a 26-page objection that largely reargued the merits of the

2 See Adv. Dkt. 12, 13, 16. By my rough calculation, I am the fourth state or federal judge to
hear the allegations made in the complaint.
3 Due to the pending motion to dismiss, Wells Fargo has not filed an answer to the plaintiff’s
complaint and no pretrial scheduling or discovery has occurred. In short, plaintiff’s complaint
is in the earliest stage of litigation.
4 Adv. Dkt. 4.
5 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).


Case 14-05192 Doc# 41 Filed 03/27/15 Page 3 of 8

avoidance motion. I then convened a hearing on the disputed Order on February 12,

2015 and heard from the parties.6 In advance of the hearing, I reviewed the electronic

recording of the proceedings on January 8, the proposed order, and Ledin’s objection.

I settled the Order by directing that counsel for Well Fargo revise the proposed order

to include two paragraphs and delete other provisions that did not accurately reflect

my ruling. The Order, as revised, was signed and entered on February 17, 2015.7 On

February 26, 2015, Ledin filed a motion for relief from that Order under Rule 60(d)(1),

to which Wells Fargo has also objected.8 That, too, remains under advisement.

On March 13, 2015, Ledin filed this motion for my recusal due to (1) my alleged

lack of impartiality and repeated failure to apply the law “because Plaintiff is

representing himself;” and (2) my alleged repeated failure to “examine the facts and

evidence submitted” showing that his claims are valid and supported by the law.9

Ledin says that I have “allowed defendant Wells Fargo Bank” to violate the automatic

stay and certain IRS regulations, and have allowed Wells Fargo to maintain the

6 At the hearing to settle the content of the Order, the Court emphasized that the purpose ofthe proceeding was to determine whether the proposed order accurately reflected his ruling.
Despite this admonition, Ledin proceeded to reargue at length the merits of his avoidance
motion and his claims under the adversary complaint. After the Court announced itsresolution of the disputed Order in open court, Ledin injected that he would have to ask JudgeNugent to recuse himself because he was “not going to tolerate this kind of abuse.” Ledin wasobviously agitated and conveyed his general frustration with the proceedings, indicating thathe has been trying to get the Wells Fargo mortgage released for seven years and had litigated
against Wells Fargo in the state trial and appellate courts, as well as federal district court –
all to no avail. The Court explained and reassured Ledin that he was not deciding the validity
of the Well Fargo mortgage at that time and that his complaint remained for later
7 Adv. Dkt. 27.
8 Adv. Dkt. 30.
9 Adv. Dkt. 36.


Case 14-05192 Doc# 41 Filed 03/27/15 Page 4 of 8

mortgage lien against his property.10 He says my disqualification is required because
I have “repeatedly failed to examine the facts and evidence, to include [sic] case law
cited by Plaintiff” that his claims are valid and supported by the law.11 He doesn’t say
specifically what evidence I have disregarded, nor does he allege any specific
misconduct on my part. His complaint about me seems to stem exclusively from my
having denied his lien avoidance motion. As discussed below, this is wholly


Bankruptcy judges are subject to recusal only under 28 U.S.C. § 455.12 Ledin
seeks my disqualification under § 455(a) (impartiality might reasonably be
questioned) and § 455(b)(1) (personal bias or prejudice concerning a party).13 The crux
of Ledin’s complaint against Wells Fargo is whether its mortgage lien against his
homestead is valid. Because of the pending motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), I
have yet to resolve that question. If Ledin’s claims survive the motion to dismiss, the
case will thereafter proceed with discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Wells Fargo’s
continued maintenance of its mortgage lien cannot form the basis for my

10 See Adv. Dkt. 36, Motion, pp. 2-6. Ledin’s allegations merely reference or recite the
statutory provisions and regulations and are conclusory in nature; he does not allege any
facts to show how I have improperly “allowed” the legal violations to occur.
11 See Adv. Dkt. 36, p. 7.
12 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5004(a); Southwestern Gold, Inc. v. Williams (In re Williams), 99 B.R. 70,
71 n. 1 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1989). By its terms, 28 U.S.C. § 144 applies only to district court
judges. In re Goodwin, 194 B.R. 214, 221 (9th Cir. BAP 1996). See also Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540 (1994).
13 Ledin has not asserted a third prong for disqualification under § 455(b)(1) – that the judge
has “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” The Court
will therefore confine its analysis to the personal bias or prejudice grounds for recusal.


Case 14-05192 Doc# 41 Filed 03/27/15 Page 5 of 8

disqualification. The adversary proceeding is not over and Wells Fargo has taken no
action on its mortgage lien post-petition, other than defend or respond to Ledin’s
voluminous filings.

All that I have decided to date is that Wells Fargo’s mortgage lien is not a
judicial lien that can be avoided under § 522(f)(1). I did that after receiving pleadings
and argument from both sides. The Bankruptcy Code defines a judicial lien as one
“obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable powers or
proceeding.”14 Section 101(51) defines a “security interest” as a “lien created by an
agreement.” It is undisputed that Ledin’s late father granted the mortgage to Wells
Fargo prepetition; as such, it arose by agreement and was a consensual rather than
a judicial lien.15 Ledin acknowledged at the January 8 hearing that Wells Fargo has
not foreclosed the mortgage. My denying his lien avoidance motion on the merits falls
far short of demonstrating that I am biased or prejudiced against Ledin or that I lack
impartiality. It is well-settled that adverse rulings alone are insufficient grounds for
disqualification of a bankruptcy judge.16 As for the adversary complaint alleged
against Wells Fargo as noted above, I have not yet considered the merits of the

14 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).
15 See In re Nichols, 265 B.R. 831 (10th Cir. BAP 2001) (consensual mortgage lien was nottransformed into judicial lien by virtue of state court’s foreclosure decree); In re Ruck, 451

B.R. 128, 131-32 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011) (even if mortgage “merged” into foreclosure decree, it
did not convert consensual lien of mortgage to judicial lien); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2202(a)
(2005) (judgment rendered by state district court shall be a lien on the real estate of thejudgment debtor in the county in which the judgment is rendered).
16 Lopez v. Behles (In re American Ready Mix, Inc.), 14 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1994); Green
v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 940 (1993).

Case 14-05192 Doc# 41 Filed 03/27/15 Page 6 of 8

In his motion, Ledin cites to my statement (in isolation) made at the January
8 hearing: “That’s what we do here.” Review of the recording of the hearing shows
that I said this at the end of my colloquy with Ledin during which I attempted to
articulate my understanding of the meaning and purpose of the Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act to clarify his misunderstanding of what that Act does
and does not provide. Bankruptcy judges regularly deal with the tax consequences of
forgiveness of debt. I cannot see how this innocuous statement, taken out of context,
casts doubt on my impartiality.17

Apart from the adverse ruling on his § 522(f)(1)(A) motion, Ledin identifies no
other judicial or extra-judicial conduct that would suggest a lack of impartiality or
personal bias or prejudice against him. The test under § 455 is whether a reasonable
person, knowing all of the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s
impartiality.18 Moreover, an allegation of bias or prejudice under § 455(b)(1) must be
based on an “extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.”19 Ledin’s motion
lacks any facts from which a reasonable person could conclude that these legal

17 See In re American Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d 1497, 1501 (evidence that the judge criticized
a party is insufficient ground for disqualification); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)
(Expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the
bounds of what imperfect men and women sometimes display, do not establish bias or
18 In re American Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d 1497, 1501. This same test also applies to recusal
sought for bias or prejudice under § 455(b)(1). See Matter of Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752 F.2d
1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984).
19 In re American Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d at 1501, citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384

U.S. 563, 583 (1966); In re Bennett, 283 B.R. 308, 322 (10th Cir. BAP 2002).

Case 14-05192 Doc# 41 Filed 03/27/15 Page 7 of 8

standards have been met in this case; it is premised entirely upon Ledin’s unfounded
belief and misapprehension of the term “judicial lien.”20

As the Tenth Circuit has noted, judges are as much obliged not to recuse when
there is no reason to do so as they are when there is. “A judge should not recuse
himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”21 Because Ledin’s
allegations do not warrant my recusal, I decline to do so. His motion is DENIED.

# # #

20 In re Bennett, 283 B.R. 308, 323 (The initial inquiry is whether a reasonable factual basis
exists for calling the judge’s impartiality into question; rumor, speculation, beliefs,
conclusions, innuendo, opinion, and similar non-factual matters are not grounds for
21 Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).


Case 14-05192 Doc# 41 Filed 03/27/15 Page 8 of 8

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